Approaching the Late Bronze Age: A Journey One Bite at a Time

The Late Bronze Age was a turbulent and complicated chapter of ancient history. It spanned centuries and stretched across a region of rising and collapsing kingdoms, shifting alliances, and changes that still echo today. Understanding this era is key to understanding ourselves. Yet much of the evidence is incomplete or broken, making it feel like solving a puzzle with missing pieces.

Most of what we know comes from archaeology, unearthing ancient sites and scattered texts. Unlike later eras with detailed records, many of these writings are damaged, lost, or hard to interpret. Parts of the story remain unclear, debated, or missing entirely.

Adding to the challenge, experts often focus on one region or power such as Egypt, Hatti, or the Levant, gaining depth but sometimes losing the bigger picture. And ancient Near Eastern texts were, in essence, royal press releases: designed to celebrate victories, omit defeats, and shape political narratives. They hold valuable facts, but reading between the lines is essential.

Some scholars, like Egyptologist Donald B. Redford, tend to give Egyptian inscriptions more weight than others might, though even he warns against trusting certain Pharaohs, such as Amenhotep II [1] too readily. Others, like Dan’el Kahn, take a more cautious stance. In his article One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward, Kahn dissects Egyptian–Mitanni relations and shows how royal texts often reflect propaganda as much as fact.

At the heart of these debates lies a central question: should we read ancient accounts as straightforward history or as political messages? Critical thinking is vital, but so is recognizing the valuable work of scholars like Redford, Kahn, and others.

The best way to approach this complex time is in manageable steps, building decade-by-decade timelines and charting major events. This lets us piece the puzzle together without getting overwhelmed. Still, many conclusions are educated guesses, filling gaps where evidence is thin.

The causes of the Bronze Age Collapse are one example. Eric H. Cline and Israel Finkelstein emphasize drought and climate change as major factors. William G. Dever warns against oversimplification, pointing instead to a mix of rebellion, migration, and warfare. This disagreement reflects a larger challenge: whether to prioritize sweeping environmental theories or keep many possible causes in play.

Relying too heavily on assumptions risks building a “house of cards” that new evidence could topple. Thoughtful skepticism, knowing what’s solid and what’s uncertain, helps us appreciate complexity and resist easy answers.

In the end, the Late Bronze Age remains a puzzle. By combining careful research, ongoing debate, and healthy skepticism, we can form a richer, more accurate picture of what happened, while respecting the mysteries that remain.

Overview

From the origins of the Mitanni state, to the resurgence of the Hittite kingdom near the end of the 15th century BCE, I will be providing a brief overview of the major political developments in the ancient Near East. This outline is meant to set the stage by introducing the key powers and dynamics of the period. It’s a concise summary designed to give you the necessary context to understand the state of affairs at the dawn of the 14th century BCE.

The main focus begins in earnest with the political landscape at the start of the 14th century BCE, which will be covered in the next essay. There, I will delve more deeply into the complex interactions between Egypt, Mitanni, Assyria, Babylon, and the Hittites. The 14th century BCE is a pivotal era of diplomatic maneuvering, military conflict, and cultural transformation.

From Mitanni Kings to Egyptian Queens

The origins of the kingdom of Mitanni, located in what is now northern Syria and Iraq, emerged near the end of Egypt’s Second Intermediate Period. This development coincided with the waning of Hyksos rule in Egypt during the late 17th to early 16th century BCE. It also coincided with the early expansion of the Old Hittite Kingdom in Anatolia, and the rise of Kassite control in Babylon. Pushback against Hittite expansion into Syria came from Hurrian-speaking polities centered in the Upper Mesopotamian region, east of the Euphrates. These people would later unite under the political entity that became known as Mitanni. By the late 16th century BCE, Mitanni was already recognizable as a rising power in the region [2]. However, the Hittites did succeed in raiding parts of northern Syria during the reign of Hattusili I of Hatti.

The rise was likely aided, at least in part, by the power vacuum in Hatti that began with the assassination of King Mursili I around 1590 BCE. His death occurred shortly after the Hittite sack of Babylon, which brought down the First Babylonian Dynasty. A people known as the Kassites, likely originating from the Zagros Mountains of modern-day Iran, later exploited the void left by the Hittite attack and seized control of Babylon. Over the next seventy years, a series of royal assassinations and internal instability further destabilized the Hittite state, leading to a contraction of its territorial control [3].

In Egypt, the Hyksos era came to an end with the rise of the 18th Dynasty around 1550 BCE. Ahmose I expelled the Asiatic Hyksos rulers who had controlled Lower Egypt for over a century [4]. To the Egyptians, these foreign rulers represented isfet, the cosmic force of disorder and chaos who stood in opposition to ma’at, the divine principle of truth, balance, and rightful order [5].

Asiatics, like other foreign groups, were often symbolically grouped under the term “the Nine Bows” [6], a collective term that represents Egypt’s traditional enemies. The later Sea Peoples would also be represented under this collective term. The consequence of the expulsion of the Hyksos was a military victory, a political act and the sacred restoration of ma’at, bringingrightful balance back to the world, which under Egyptian theology, Egypt of course, was at the center of [7].

After reclaiming the Nile Delta, Ahmose I would follow the Hyksos to their stronghold of Sharuhen, possibly modern Tell el-Ajjul in the Gaza Strip, and laid siege for three years. Ahmose I would also raid towns in southern Canaan to intimidate the local population and assert Egyptian dominance. These campaigns laid the foundation for what would later become a Levantine buffer zone under Egyptian influence. The buffer zone was likely understood as needed due to the experience of Hyksos rule in Egypt. The perceived Asiatic threats would justify the numerous preemptivestrikes that Egypt was about to engage in [8].

Records of Amenhotep I’s campaigns are scarce, but not entirely absent [9]. His actions would also ensure gold from Nubia in the south and this is attested to by the creation of fortified Egyptian strongholds in the region of Nubia near key mining areas. Egyptologist Toby Wilkinson claims that a garrison was installed in the southern Levant following the siege of Sharuhen however there is no material evidence to support this claim [10]. 

The earliest references to Mitanni in Egyptian records dates to the early 18th Dynasty. This was documented by the Egyptian court astronomer Amenemhat and reports of Egyptian military activity involving Mitanni however the text is fragmentary. Egyptian military engagement is also attested to in the autobiographical inscriptions of Ahmose, son of Ebana, and Ahmose Pen-Nekhbet, who served in the Egyptian army and participated in Syrian and the Levantine campaigns. These events likely occurred during the reign of Thutmose I, the successor of Amenhotep I. Although some of the inscriptions referencing these campaigns are preserved within the royal inscriptions, compilation occurred during the reign of Thutmose III ^[11].

Egypt likely viewed Mitanni as a regional threat. This conclusion is supported by the autobiographical inscription of Ahmose, son of Ibana who records:

 “His Majesty reached Naharin (Mitanni) and found that the fallen one had mustered his troops. Then His Majesty made a great slaughter among them, there was no end to the living captives His Majesty took in his victory”.

However, at this time Egypt was not yet the empire we understand in history. Egypt’s rise to empire status would occur later during Egypt’s 18^th dynasty under the reign of Thutmose III. Thutmose I pushed as far east as the Euphrates but this did not result in sustained occupation or major resistance to Mitanni expansion in the Levant. After his single campaign, Egypt withdrew leaving a power vacuum in the northern Levant which Mitanni quickly filled [12].

By this time, Mitanni had exerted influence over Assyria, which was politically weakened following the decline of Amorite-dominated kingdoms such as Babylon, Mari, and Yamhad (Aleppo). King Shaushtatar of Mitanni sacked the city of Assur, temporarily bringing Assyria under Mitanni’s influence [13], though the precise date remains unknown. The absence of royal Assyrian inscriptions from this period supports the view that Assyria had lost much of its autonomy under Mitanni dominance.

Not much is known about the reign of Thutmose II, who ruled for only a few years. Estimates range from three [14]  to thirteen. He is recorded to have led a campaign in Nubia against the Kingdom of Kush, while the official Ahmose Pen-Nekhbet reports minor military activity in the Sinai against Bedouin nomads, likely the Shasu, and possibly as far north as Syria [15]. The limited scope of these campaigns may have been due to his brief reign potentially as a result of illness, possibly a congenital heart defect [16].

After his death, the queen acted as regent and soon assumed full royal titles. Some scholars speculate that her diplomatic policies during this period may partly explain the lack of military campaigns under Thutmose II, though this remains uncertain. This queen of Egypt is known to us as Hatshepsut ^[17].

Hatshepsut successfully navigated a patriarchal system to rule effectively, demonstrating remarkable political skill. She was an outlier in a male dominated society and arguably one of Egypt’s greatest Pharaohs. As the stepmother and aunt of the young Thutmose III, who was pharaoh in name only, she ruled in his stead from 1479 to 1458 BCE. During her reign, Egypt launched no major foreign military campaigns in the Levant or Syria, focusing instead on internal building projects and trade expeditions, including her famed voyage to Punt. ^[18].

The Egyptian Empire and The Shattered Rival

Upon Hatshepsut’s death, Thutmose III reasserted direct control and initiated a series of military campaigns aimed at reestablishing Egyptian dominance in the Near East, where Mitanni influence had grown. His first major campaign culminated in the Battle of Megiddo, in which Egyptian forces confronted a Canaanite coalition led by the king of Kadesh, who was aligned with Mitanni interests. Following a risky flanking maneuver through a narrow pass, Thutmose caught the Canaanite forces by surprise and laid siege to Megiddo, ultimately securing a decisive victory [19].  

Thutmose III continued with coastal campaigns against Mitanni interests and reasserted control in the region. He would finally directly confront Mitanni in his thirty-third regnalyear with this being his eighth campaign. The Mitanni forces retreated. It is also suggested that King Sauštatar of Mitanni escaped with the retreating army [20], though scholars disagree on the details.

Thutmose III continued to campaign against Mitanni interests and Mitanni resisted Egyptian advances. This would have been the ninth campaign of Thutmose III and marked the maximum territorial reach of Egypt. As per Redford, Egypt managed to assert control over much of northern Syria [21]. Kahn argues that Mitanni maintained control of northern Syria and that the balance of power remained largely unchanged [22]. Regardless of whether Redford’s or Kahn’s interpretation is accepted, Egypt was now the undisputed power in the southern Levant [23]. Thutmose III would continue to campaign with a total of seventeen campaigns by the end of his reign [24]. This marks Thutmose III as one of the greatest military Pharaohs.

Likely during the reign of King Šauštatar, Mitanni began an informal peace arrangement with Pharaoh Thutmose III, estimated to have taken place between 1440 and 1435 BCE. This tentative understanding appears to have brought active hostilities to an end and laid the groundwork for an eventual alliance between the two former rivals, although the specifics remain speculative. Mitanni may have pursued this peace in part to avoid a two-front war, as tensions with the resurgent Hittite kingdom to the northwest were increasing [25]. However, while peace with Egypt held, a second front would eventually emerge from the east. Approximately seventy-five years later, the resurgence of Assyria would begin pressing back against Mitanni.

Continued military responses from Egypt under Amenhotep II met with limited success [26].  Even though there is no record of Egyptian engagement with Mitanni under Amenhotep II, Egypt escalated efforts to destabilize the Levant and Syria by conducting mass deportations of local populations into Egypt. This would include against Mitanni interests, a deliberate policy aimed at weakening resistance through fear [27].

But if Egypt truly held the advantage, why didn’t they decisively defeat Mitanni, especially with the growing threat of the re-emerging Hittites? Perhaps the Egyptians didn’t see the Hittites as a serious threat at the time, or Mitanni may have mounted a stronger defense than Egyptian accounts admit. As previously stated, it wouldn’t be out of character for Bronze Age rulers to exaggerate their victories, and, of course, that’s something we still see today.

Although the reign of Pharaoh Amenhotep III postdates this era, there is evidence from his period that may shed light on Egypt’s perception of the emerging Hittite threat. Amarna Letter EA 31 is one of the early Amarna Letter. Amenhotep III writes to Tarhundaradu, king of Arzawa in westernAnatolian, a rival of the Hittites. The letter confirms that Amenhotep III maintained diplomatic ties with other Great Kings in the Anatolian region [28].

It is worth noting there is no existing letter from Amenhotep III addressing any Hittite king. No known correspondence from a Hittite ruler to this Pharaoh survives. The Hittites were clearly not an Egyptian vassal, but Egypt didn’t treat them as diplomatic equals, at least not in the surviving documentation. This raises a question. Did Amenhotep III deliberately exclude the Hittite king from the circle of Great Kings who were deemed worthy of formal correspondence [29]?

The lack of correspondence between Amenhotep III and the Hittite court may have been an oversight or diplomatic snub by the Egyptians [30]. We must be careful of interpretation and note the questionable discovery of the Amarna letters. The history of their discovery implies possible missing letters, but we must also acknowledge that some of the letters are damaged and cannot be deciphered. However, there is evidence in previously mentioned Amarna Letter EA 31 that gives insight. In this letter Amenhotep III acknowledges a claim from Tarhundaradu, king of Arzawa:

and that the country Ḫattuša is shattered [31].

This perception of a “shattered” Hatti in Amarna Letter EA 31 mirrors a retrospective account from a later Hittite king, likely Ḫattušili III or possibly Tudḫaliya IV, looking back on a time when the kingdom faced devastation from multiple enemies. In this decree, the king lists the directions from which Hatti’s foes struck, the cities they destroyed, and how the capital itself was burned:

Decree of Ḫattušili III regarding the exemption of the ḫekur of Pirwa from taxation

In earlier days, the lands of Ḫatti were completely destroyed by the enemy. From one side […] (and) the Kaška enemy came and destroyed the lan[ds] of Ḫatti and made Nenašša (his) border. From another side, fro[m] (the side of) the Lower [Lan]d, came the Arzawa enemy, he too destroyed the lands of Ḫatti and made [T]uwanu(w)a and Uda (his) border. From another side, the enemy from Araun[na] [ca]me and destroyed the whole of the Land of Gaššiya. From another side, the enemy from Azzi cam[e and] the whole of [the land]s of the Upper Land [destroy]ed and mad[e] Šamuḫa (his) border. And the [enemy from] Išuwa came [and] destroyed the [Lan]d of Tegarama. From another side the enemy from Armatana [came an]d he too destroyed the lan[ds o]f Ḫatti and [mad]e Kizzuwatna, the city, [(his) border]. And the c[ity of Ḫatt]uša had been completely burned down, but […] the ḫešta-house had escaped. But [w]hen the father of my father, Š[uppiluluma, Great Kin]g, Hero, rose to power and s[at] on the throne of kingship, he [fou]ght off [the enemies] from the lands of Ḫatti and the de[sert/empty] Land of Ḫatti he occupied/settled [agai]n [32].

Stability Returns to Hatti and Egypt’s Blind Spot

By the end of the 15th century BCE, Hatti was emerging from a prolonged period of internal instability and was beginning to reassert its influence across Anatolia and into northern Syria. But it appears that Egypt was either unaware of or dismissive toward this resurgence. Around this time, the Hittites renewed a treaty with the kingdom of Kizzuwadna [33], originally established over a century earlier [34]. This would reaffirming a strategic alliance and restoring a buffer zone in southeastern Anatolia. The renewed agreement, between Tudḫaliya I/II of Hatti and Šunaššura of Kizzuwadna, marked a shift that would have profound consequences. Hatti’s decline was about to come to an end and was fast becoming a serious regional power once again. It is plausible that Mitanni perceived this shift earlier than Egypt did.

Because Amarna Letter EA 31 describes Ḫattuša as “shattered” the perception may reflect the memory of Hatti’s earlier collapse described in Hittite royal inscription. If Amenhotep III relied on outdated or second-hand intelligence, this may explain Egypt’s lack of formal correspondence with the Hittite court during his reign. Whether this was a diplomatic snub or a genuine underestimation remains open to interpretation.

But whatever the Egyptians thought of the Hittites, even with the upcoming marriage alliance arranged by Šuttarna II of Mitanni and Amenhotep III of Egypt, Mitanni’s days were numbered. Although this interpretation is speculative, it’s ironic that a treaty meant to stabilize the region may have helped unravel it, as we will see with the rise of the Habiru in Amurru in the next essay, another contributor to the domino effect culminating in the final collapse. Egypt’s apparent blind spot to Hittite reemergence and the treaty with Mitanni were two among many factors that eventually fed into the later crisis we now call the Late Bronze Age Collapse. However, pinpointing a single cause in an overarching theory is nearly impossible, a view shared by Archeologist William G. Dever in his book Beyond the Text, where he critiques such reductionist approaches as “scientism masquerading as history” [35].

On Šauštatar’s death around 1420 BCE, the Mitanni throne passed to Artatama I, who would later formalize the treaty initiated between King Šauštatar and Pharaoh Thutmose III. At this time, Amenhotep II was pharaoh, and it was his son, who would later become Thutmose IV, that married the Mitanni princess around 1415 BCE  [36] to seal the treaty.

During his reign Thutmose IV would also engage in similar mass deportations as his father but, Egypt and Mitanni enjoyed peace. On the death of Artatama I, Šuttarna II would rise to power in Mitanni, about 1400 BCE. A decade later Amenhotep III would ascend to the Egyptian throne and reap the benefits of the previous Egyptian campaigns and the Egyptian/Mitanni alliance. Further marriage alliances would continue to strengthen the relationship [37].

Also, at the close of the 15th century BCE, leadership in Hatti underwent a transition. With a revised treaty established between Hatti and Kizzuwadna, Arnuwanda I succeeded Tudhaliya I, marking the end of the Hittite Middle Kingdom and the beginning of the Hittite New Kingdom, or Empire period. Territorial contraction would soon come to an end, ushering in a new phase of expansion and renewed strength for Hatti.

Conclusion

Meanwhile, in the southern Levant, the reverberations of Egypt’s imperial campaigns that were launched in the aftermath of the Hyksos expulsion, continued to reshape lives and landscapes of the people of the Levant. Mass deportations, forced labor, and cultural disruption became a recurring theme of Egyptian control. These traumas were etched not only in Egyptian records but perhaps more enduringly into the oral memories of the peoples affected.

Though the biblical Exodus story is not supported by material evidence in its traditional form, this period may hold the earliest memory that later inspired stories of bondage and deliverance, memories shaped by the realities of imperial power. Without material proof or intersecting lines of circumstantial evidence, such connections must be approached with caution and healthy skepticism.

It is here, at the dawn of the 14th century BCE, that we enter the next phase of our examination in a world of shifting alliances, rising powers, and, for the first time in the historical record, a name that will echo through the biblical tradition: Yahweh. Interesting that this name may appear not once, but twice, centuries before the first books of the Bible took shape. What it meant in this early context is the question, but is there an answer?

References

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[1] Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), .164.

[2] Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), .136.

[3] Amelie Kuhrt, The Ancient Near East c. 3000–330 BC, vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 1995), 240–245.

[4] Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 107.

[5] Geraldine Pinch, Handbook of Egyptian Mythology (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2002), 4.

[6] Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 51.

[7] Ian Shaw, “Egypt and the Outside World,” in The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt, ed. Ian Shaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 309–310.

[8] Susanna Thomas, Ahmose: Liberator of Egypt (New York: Rosen Publishing Group, 2003), 59–63.

[9] Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 148-149.

[10]  Toby Wilkinson, The Rise and Fall of Ancient Egypt, 189–191.

[11] Dan’el Kahn, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards: The Relations between Amenhotep III, King of Egypt and Tushratta, King of Mitanni,” in Egypt, Canaan and Israel: History, Imperialism, Ideology and Literature, ed. S. Bar, D. Kahn, and J. J. Shirley (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 137-138.

[12] Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 153-155.

[13] Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 139.

[14] Philip Derstine, “Early Eighteenth Dynasty Chronology and Thutmoside Succession,” Göttinger Miszellen 252 (2017), 43.

[15] Joyce Tyldesley, The First Woman Pharaoh (London: Penguin Books, 2022), 31–36.

[16] Philip Derstine, “Early Eighteenth Dynasty Chronology and Thutmoside Succession,” Göttinger Miszellen 252 (2017), 44

[17] Betsy M. Bryan, “The 18th Dynasty Before the Amarna Period,” in The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt, ed. Ian Shaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 226-229.

[18] Betsy M. Bryan, “The 18th Dynasty Before the Amarna Period,” in The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt, ed. Ian Shaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 229-234.

[19] Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 156-157.

[20] Dan’el Kahn, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards: The Relations between Amenhotep III, King of Egypt and Tushratta, King of Mitanni,” in Egypt, Canaan and Israel: History, Imperialism, Ideology and Literature, ed. S. Bar, D. Kahn, and J. J. Shirley (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 137.

[21] Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 159-160

[22] Kahn, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards,”, 137.

[23] Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 160.

[24] Amelie Kuhrt, The Ancient Near East c. 3000–330 BC, vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 1995), 193.

[25] Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 163-165

[26] Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 162-163.

[27] Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 168-169.

[28] William L. Moran, The Amarana Letters, 101-103.

[29] William L. Moran, The Amarana Letters, xvi.

[30] Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 163

[31] William L. Moran, The Amarana Letters, 101.

[32] Maria Elena Balza, “KBo 6.28+, or: Ḫattušili III between Past and Future,” Ancient Near Eastern Studies 59 (2022): 148–150.

[33] Gary Beckman, Hittite Diplomatic Texts, 2nd ed., ed. Harry A. Hoffner Jr. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999), CTH 133, 13–22.

[34] Gary Beckman, Hittite Diplomatic Texts, 2nd ed., ed. Harry A. Hoffner Jr. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999), CTH 21, 11-13

[35] William G. Dever, Beyond the Text: Archaeology and Biblical Narrative (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2017), 110.

[36] Boaz Stavi, The Reign of Tudhaliya II and Šuppiluliuma I: The Contribution of the Hittite Documentation to a Reconstruction of the Amarna Age (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2015), 29.

[37] Donald B. Redford Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 165-169